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FREE WILL PARADIGMS 
KENT GREENFIELD* 
One of the iconic issues in American law and politics is the 
question of free will—sometimes known as agency, choice, or 
autonomy, or the absence of duress, coercion, and compulsion. In 
politics, whether one is liberal or conservative, we balk at government 
limitations on choice and fight those limitations with legal arguments 
about rights and political rhetoric about freedom. Liberals demand 
access to abortions, want the ability to purchase medical marijuana, 
and bristle at pat-down searches before boarding a plane. 
Conservatives dislike requirements to buy health insurance or pay 
taxes, rail against limits on gun ownership and school prayer, and 
decry government regulation of everything from food to the 
environment. Liberals and conservatives may disagree about the 
specifics of what they want to be free to choose, but both sides believe 
that choice is a good thing.1 
In law, the notion of choice and free will is ubiquitous. For 
example, only contracts freely entered into are considered valid—if a 
contract is the result of duress, it is unenforceable. In tort law, some 
acts are torts because they infringe on the will of others—a fist to the 
nose is a tort if not consented to, and merely pugilism if it is. Rape is 
sexual intercourse without consent. Sexual harassment law prohibits 
sexual attention in the workplace that is unwanted and unconsented-
to. Under the Fourth Amendment, courts admit evidence seized 
without a warrant if that evidence was found in the course of 
consensual searches. Under the Fifth Amendment, confessions of a 
criminal suspect are admissible if uncoerced. Under the First 
Amendment Free Speech Clause, a “fixed star in our constitutional 
constellation,”2 the government cannot force one to speak. Under the 
Free Exercise Clause, the government cannot require religious 
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 1.  See KENT GREENFIELD, THE MYTH OF CHOICE: PERSONAL RESPONSIBILITY IN A 
WORLD OF LIMITS 1 (2011). 
 2.  W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943). 
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activity or adherence. Under the Tenth Amendment, the federal 
government cannot impose coercive conditions on funding going to 
states. One of the most important legal issues in our country today, for 
instance, is whether the federal government can impose an “individual 
mandate” to purchase health insurance. The question destined for the 
Supreme Court is whether Congress acted beyond its Commerce 
Clause power when it took from individuals the choice of whether to 
buy health insurance. 
In one way or another, each of these political and legal questions 
turns on the nature of choice and free will. But defining free will is 
famously difficult and the question has bedeviled philosophers and 
legal theorists for centuries. This article presents the view that the 
Supreme Court has implicitly adopted three different definitions, or 
paradigms, of free will and choice. By outlining these paradigms, one 
gains insights into the analysis the Court uses to decide cases that 
depend on notions of free will. 
This article proceeds as follows. In Part I, I introduce the three 
paradigms by discussing the famous case of West Virginia v. Barnette,3 
in which the Supreme Court struck down a mandate that 
schoolchildren recite the Pledge of Allegiance. In Part II, I place the 
debate about free will into a larger philosophical and theoretical 
context. In the subsequent three parts, I walk through each of the 
three paradigms—the “ultra-dispositionalist,” the “libertarian,” and 
the “situationalist.” Focusing on constitutional law cases, I highlight 
some of the prominent examples of the Court’s use of each paradigm 
to analyze and decide cases. 
I.  INTRODUCING THREE PARADIGMS OF FREE WILL 
At the beginning of each school day, millions of children in the 
United States stand to pledge their allegiance to the American flag.4 
Ought a student be free to refuse? Under current law in the United 
States, a state can require the Pledge to be recited daily in all public 
schools, provided that individual students are able to opt out.5 
 
 3.  Id. 
 4.  According to the website Patriotism for All, forty-three of the fifty states require 
schools to begin the day with a recitation of the Pledge. See Pledge Laws: State-by-State (2007), 
PATRIOTISM FOR ALL, http://members.cox.net/patriotismforall/state_laws.html (last accessed 
Nov. 6, 2011). 
 5.  See, e.g., Mass. Office of the Att’y Gen., 1942–44 Rep. of the Att’y Gen. Which 
Contains Official Opinions Rendered, 64 (“[P]upils in the public schools may not be required to 
salute the flag nor to recite the ‘Pledge of Allegiance to the Flag.’ Neither can pupils refusing to 
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Whether one believes the current state of the law is correct depends 
on, among other things, what one believes about the nature of free 
will, consent, and choice. There are three possible ways to think about 
this question. 
One view, implicitly championed by Justice Frankfurter in his 
dissent in Barnette, is that an individual’s will is not easily vitiated. As 
any student of First Amendment law will remember, Barnette reached 
the Court during World War II, when a number of states began 
requiring children to begin their school day by saluting the flag and 
reciting the Pledge of Allegiance. In West Virginia, a public school 
suspended a student who was a Jehovah’s Witness for refusing to say 
the Pledge because it conflicted with his religious beliefs. Only three 
years before, the Court had upheld a pledge requirement in 
Minersville School District v. Gobitis,6 and Justice Frankfurter, one of 
the more scholarly justices of the last century, argued in Barnette that 
the Court should not reverse itself. He pointed out that no one was 
forcing the child to attend public school;7 the school should be 
permitted, if it so chooses, to condition the privilege of coming to 
school on a pledge requirement.8 Parents of children who did not 
want to recite the Pledge could change the law democratically9 or 
move to a different jurisdiction where the Pledge was not required.10 
Implicit in Justice Frankfurter’s argument is an assumption that 
human decision-making is not so fragile that coercion occurs merely 
because the government imposes costs on certain choices.11 As Justice 
 
participate in such ceremonies be disciplined for their refusal or required to state the reasons for 
such refusal.”). Even if state laws do not explicitly protect a right to opt out, Barnette requires it 
as a matter of First Amendment law.  
 6.  310 U.S. 586, 599–600 (1940). 
 7.  Barnette, 319 U.S. at 656 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (“West Virginia does not compel 
the attendance at its public schools of the children here concerned.”). 
 8.  See id. (noting that the question in the case was “the right of the state to compel 
participation in this exercise by those who choose to attend the public schools”); id. at 657 
(“Parents have the privilege of choosing which schools they wish their children to attend. And 
the question here is whether the state may make certain requirements that seem to it desirable 
or important for the proper education of those future citizens who go to schools maintained by 
the states, or whether the pupils in those schools may be relieved from those requirements if 
they run counter to the consciences of their parents.”); see also Gobitis, 310 U.S. at 599 (noting 
that states may not require students to attend public schools).  
 9.  See Barnette, 319 U.S. at 647 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (“For the removal of unwise 
laws from the statute books appeal lies, not to the courts, but to the ballot and to the processes 
of democratic government.” (quoting United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 79 (1936) (Stone, J., 
dissenting))). 
 10.  Id. at 657, 664 (arguing that parents have the privilege of choosing which schools they 
wish their children to attend). 
 11.  See id. at 656 (“Compelling belief implies denial of opportunity to combat it and to 
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Frankfurter wrote in his dissent, even if children are expelled from 
school for refusing to recite the Pledge, “[c]hildren and their parents 
may believe what they please, avow their belief and practice it.”12 
Justice Frankfurter’s opinion is an example of what I will call the 
“ultra-dispositionalist” paradigm because it assumes that individuals’ 
own dispositions dictate their behavior even in the face of quite 
strong governmental and situational constraints or influences. This 
paradigm is the most sanguine about free will, and assumes that 
humans act freely even in the face of government mandates or 
encouragements that significantly burden choice. Even in analyzing 
areas of constitutional law where “freedom” is the touchstone, such as 
First Amendment law, one can assume that humans act with sufficient 
strength of will that a government thumb on the scale is not 
necessarily suspect. The focus of the ultra-dispositionalist paradigm is 
whether options exist—if they do, even if they are burdensome, the 
assumption is that an individual’s will is robust enough to choose 
among them. The Court uses this paradigm infrequently, but it is not 
unknown in constitutional doctrine. It is embodied in some 
“unconstitutional conditions” cases and defended by some legal 
theorists and judges. 
In Barnette, the Court itself adopted a different view of free will. 
Justice Robert Jackson’s opinion striking down the compulsory 
pledge is among the most famous in all of free speech law: “If there is 
any fixed star in our constitutional constellation, it is that no official, 
high or petty, can prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics, 
nationalism, religion, or other matters of opinion or force citizens to 
confess by word or act their faith therein.”13 Justice Jackson was 
saying that choices can indeed be affected by government action and 
that such effects can be constitutionally suspect, especially when 
personal freedom is the constitutional touchstone. The government 
must be ready to justify its impact on the will of its citizens. 
Also implicit in the Court’s opinion in Barnette was the notion 
that absent government constraint, the students’ behavior is freely 
chosen. Once the Court removes its mandate, what is left is a situation 
in which individuals can act freely. Because this view maps well with 
 
assert dissident views. Such compulsion is one thing. Quite another matter is submission to 
conformity of action while denying its wisdom or virtue and with ample opportunity for seeking 
its change or abrogation.”). 
 12.  Id. at 664. 
 13.  Id. at 642. 
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political libertarianism, taking as its guidepost the presence or 
absence of governmental influence and considering government as 
the principal constraint on individual free will,14 I call this paradigm 
“libertarian.” In this paradigm, the government is the only material 
source of limits on free will; constraints of situation are ignored or 
considered immaterial. With a government mandate, ban, or 
significant burden on a choice or set of choices, free will does not 
exist. Without such mandate, ban, or burden, free will thrives. This 
paradigm is seen in many different constitutional law cases, including 
those about economic due process, reproductive rights, and free 
speech. 
A third view challenges the assumption that government is the 
principal source of constraints on choice and free will. This last 
paradigm is the most attuned to the constraints of situation, and is 
thus named “situationalist.” Even without a government mandate, 
ban, or burden, situational pressures may be sufficiently coercive to 
vitiate free will. To illustrate, consider a jurisdiction that requires the 
Pledge to be recited in classrooms as long as individual students can 
opt out. Even with such a right to opt out, one could believe that 
students are not in fact free to refuse.15 The effects of peer and teacher 
pressure, along with the fear of being socially ostracized, may be 
sufficiently great that individual students feel compelled, despite 
personal beliefs, to recite the Pledge. One could believe that such 
impacts constitute limits on the free will of the students affected. In 
other words, one could hold a “situational” view of free will—that 
sometimes free will is vitiated by situation, even without 
governmental action. While the Court apparently does not hold the 
situationalist view of free will in the Pledge of Allegiance context,16 
 
 14.  Cf. id. at 646 (referring to the Court’s decision as “libertarian”). 
 15.  David Koon, A Boy and His Flag, ARK. TIMES, Nov. 11, 2009, available at 
http://www.arktimes.com/arkansas/a-boy-and-his-flag/Content?oid=1013276 (discussing the case 
of Will Phillips, a boy who refused to recite the Pledge and was harassed by teachers and other 
students); Jenna Johnson, Pledge of Allegiance Dispute Results in Md. Teacher Having to 
Apologize, WASH. POST, Feb. 24, 2010, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2010/02/23/AR2010022303889.html (discussing a thirteen-year-old girl who 
was shouted at, mocked by classmates, and escorted from the classroom by school security for 
refusing to recite the Pledge). 
 16.  Cf. Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 5 (2004) (rejecting a First 
Amendment-based challenge to a pledge requirement on standing grounds); Croft v. Perry, 624 
F.3d 157, 162, 166, 170 (5th Cir. 2010) (finding that neither Texas's state Pledge of Allegiance, 
nor the law requiring its recitation by school children, violated the Establishment Clause 
because a reference to “God” does not favor a particular faith, the language “under God” has 
permissible secular purposes, and requiring recitation does not impermissibly coerce religious 
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there are other cases in which the Court implicitly adopts this 
perspective.17 
Barnette is just one example of a case in which the outcome 
depends in part on underlying assumptions about how human beings 
make decisions and how they exercise their will. Because so many 
parts of constitutional law turn on questions of freedom (e.g., free 
speech doctrine) or consent (e.g., search and seizure doctrine), the 
Court’s assumptions about free will have a material effect on its 
analysis and conclusions. Hundreds of constitutional cases turn on 
which of these three basic paradigms the Court adopts.18 
II. THE PHILOSOPHICAL AND LEGAL NOTION OF CHOICE 
For hundreds, if not thousands, of years, one of the central topics 
in philosophy has been the question of free will.19 The fight between 
the determinists, who claim that humans cannot affect their future, 
and the metaphysical libertarians, who believe that individuals affect 
their future through the exercise of will, has dominated much of 
philosophical debate. This debate is far from resolution.20 
 
belief); Newdow v. Rio Linda Union Sch. Dist., 597 F.3d 1007, 1040 (9th Cir. 2010) (holding that 
a California statute and school district policy requiring recitation of the Pledge of Allegiance did 
not violate the Establishment Clause because the Pledge is one of allegiance to the Republic, 
not of allegiance to God or to any religion); Frazier ex rel. Frazier v. Winn, 535 F.3d 1279, 1282 
(11th Cir. 2008) (holding that a Florida statute requiring students to stand at attention during 
the Pledge of Allegiance violated the First Amendment because it compelled all students, even 
those excused by parental permission from reciting the Pledge, to stand during the Pledge); 
Myers v. Loudoun Cnty. Pub. Schs., 418 F.3d 395, 407 (4th Cir. 2005) (holding that Virginia's 
Recitation Statute did not violate the Establishment Clause because pledging allegiance is not a 
religious exercise, but a patriotic one). 
 17.  See infra Part V. 
 18.  While the focus of this article is on constitutional law, it is not only constitutional cases 
that turn on questions of consent, choice, and will. Tort law, contract law, and criminal law—just 
to mention three—all turn on these questions in various ways. For a general overview, see 
GREENFIELD, supra note 1. 
 19.  In his Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, David Hume called it, “the most 
contentious question of metaphysics, the most contentious question of science.” DAVID HUME, 
ENQUIRY CONCERNING HUMAN UNDERSTANDING, § VIII (Clarendon Press 1975) (1748). See 
generally TED HONDERICH, A THEORY OF DETERMINISM: THE MIND, NEUROSCIENCE AND 
LIFE-HOPES 13–70 (Clarendon Press 1988). In the wake of the debate between free will and 
determinism, a debate has raged between compatibilists, who argue that the two theories can be 
reconciled, and incompatibilists, who argue that they cannot. In the twentieth century, 
compatibilism has been defended in the work of American philosophers Harry Frankfurt, 
Daniel Dennet, and several others, while incompatibilism has been defended by philosopher 
Robert Kane and NYU Professor of Philosophy and Law Thomas Nagel. For a summary of the 
two positions, see KASPER LIPPERT-RASMUSSEN, DEONTOLOGY, RESPONSIBILITY, AND 
EQUALITY (2005). 
 20.  The debate has ancient philosophical roots. Empidocles (c. 490–430 BCE) and 
Heraclitis (c. 535–475 BCE) are early pre-Socratic sources on the meaning of determinism in 
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Meanwhile, it is often assumed that conventional legal theory and 
doctrine has cast its lot with the libertarians. An underlying 
assumption of our legal system is that human beings make choices 
and act with free will. The law affects those choices beforehand by 
defining proper behavior and by promising the punishment of 
improper behavior. Any ex post punishment is just, it is said, because 
one’s choices flow from one’s will, and it is proper to punish wrong 
behavior that is intentional.21 What this means is that the implicit 
model of human decision-making in law is assumed to be something 
like: 
Will  Choices  Behavior  Effect 
The notion is that effects on the outside world result from our 
behavior, which in turn is based on our choices, which in turn are 
based on will.22 Because effects ultimately can be attributed to will, 
good effects are evidence of maturity, an exemplary conscience, and a 
sense of personal responsibility. Alternatively, bad effects are 
evidence of immaturity, a depraved heart and mind, and a failure of 
personal responsibility. In economics terms, will is the exogenous 
variable, taken as given.23 
 
 
natural law. The modern debate between free will and determinism is typically traced to 
eighteenth-century French philosopher Pierre Simon de Laplace’s (1749–1827) assertions about 
determinism. For a general overview, see FREE WILL AND DETERMINISM (Bernard Berofsky 
ed., 1966). See also TED HONDERICH, ON DETERMINISM AND FREEDOM (2005). Far from 
finding resolution between defenders of determinism and believers in free will, the debate 
remains unresolved in at least one philosopher’s thought. See THOMAS NAGEL, THE VIEW 
FROM NOWHERE 112 (1986) (remarking in his account of determinism and free will that the 
author changes his mind about the subject every time he thinks about it). For a general 
overview of determinism, see Ernest Nagel, Determinism in History, in DETERMINISM, FREE 
WILL, AND MORAL RESPONSIBILITY 49 (Gerald Dworkin ed., 1970). 
 21.  See William Kneale, The Responsibility of Criminals, in THE PHILOSOPHY OF 
PUNISHMENT: A COLLECTION OF PAPERS 172, 184 (H.B. Acton ed., MacMillan St. Martin’s 
Press 1969). For other attempts to define punishment, see H.L.A. HART, PUNISHMENT AND 
RESPONSIBILITY: ESSAYS IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 4–5 (1968); Kent Greenawalt, 
Punishment, in 3 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF CRIME AND JUSTICE 1282 (Joshua Dressler ed., 2d ed. 
2002). 
 22.  This schematic is a riff on others I have seen. See Jon Hanson & David Yosifon, The 
Situational Character: A Critical Realist Perspective on the Human Animal, 93 GEO. L.J. 1, 26 
(2004). 
 23.  See Adam Benforado, Jon Hanson & David Yosifon, Broken Scales: Obesity and 
Justice in America, 53 EMORY L.J. 1645, 1802 (2004) (“[D]ispositionism [the belief that people’s 
own choices determine their behavior] has had and continues to have an immense effect on both 
the framing and resolution of virtually every major social policy debate, from affirmative action 
to standardized testing, from gun control to school ‘choice,’ and from gay rights to the war on 
terrorism.”). 
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theory and doctrine, which scholars are beginning to explore.26 This 
article introduces the question of whether existing law ever takes into 
account a more nuanced view of human agency and will. 
Notwithstanding the conventional wisdom highlighted above, is the 
law more sophisticated in its assumptions about human decision-
making than one might at first assume? The answer, I suggest, is that 
the Supreme Court utilizes three different theoretical approaches to 
the question of free will and choice, introduced above. They do not 
always take individual will as a given. In fact, the Court occasionally 
has used a much more situational view of human choice. 
Before I move on to a more detailed analysis of each paradigm, I 
want to make one quick note about terminology. What I call the ultra-
dispositionalist paradigm generally maps best with the philosophical 
notion of metaphysical libertarianism. What I call the situationalist 
paradigm has most in common with determinism. Finally, the 
libertarian paradigm is somewhere in the middle, and is not to be 
confused with metaphysical libertarianism. 
III. THE ULTRA-DISPOSITIONALIST PARADIGM 
In the ultra-dispositionalist paradigm, the focus is not on the 
presence of government activity, but on the existence of other choices. 
Even if government makes certain choices more burdensome, the 
assumption is that individuals’ free will is robust enough that such 
burdens are immaterial. In the Pledge of Allegiance context, this 
paradigm is exemplified by the Court’s view in Gobitis and Justice 
Frankfurter’s dissent in Barnette. They argue that a requirement to 
recite the Pledge is not coercive because students can move to a 
different jurisdiction or fight for democratic change in the law. This 
paradigm implicitly considers human will to be quite strong because it 
assumes that if the student really objects to the Pledge, his decision to 
recite it or not will not be affected by the government mandate. The 
student’s will is a given, an exogenous variable in the constitutional 
calculation. 
The best examples of the ultra-dispositionalist paradigm are in 
cases surrounding consensual searches. While there are many 
exceptions to the general rule that law enforcement personnel need a 
 
 26.  See references in supra note 24. See also GREENFIELD, supra note 1. For a cautionary 
note, suggesting the influence of these insights may be less than argued in the short term, see 
Stephen J. Morse, Lost in Translation? An Essay on Law and Neuroscience, in LAW AND 
NEUROSCIENCE: CURRENT LEGAL ISSUES VOL. 13, at 529 (Michael Freeman ed., 2010). 
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warrant to conduct searches of “persons, houses, papers, and effects,”27 
the most-used exception is probably consensual searches. By many 
accounts, an increasing percentage of law enforcement searches are 
conducted pursuant to the consent of the person searched,28 and thus 
the Court frequently has faced the question of how voluntary the 
search must be in order to be “consensual.”29 The answer, in general, is 
not very, mostly because the Court applies the ultra-dispositionalist 
paradigm. 
 
 
 27.  U.S. CONST. amend. IV; Theodore P. Metzler et al., Warrantless Searches and Seizures, 
37 GEO. L.J. ANN. REV. CRIM. PROC. 39, passim (2008) (outlining exceptions to the general rule 
that police officers need a warrant to conduct searches); Search Incident to Valid Arrest, 91 GEO. 
L.J. 54, 88–99 (2003) (discussing the many exceptions to the probable cause and warrant 
requirements); CRAIG R. DUCAT, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION: RIGHTS OF THE 
INDIVIDUAL 625 (2009) (expounding on the number of exceptions to the requirement that every 
search and seizure is supported by a warrant); see also Lo-Ji Sales, Inc. v. New York, 442 U.S. 
319, 326 (1979) (holding that contraband may be seized without a warrant under the “plain 
view” doctrine); Heller v. New York, 413 U.S. 483, 488 (1973) (finding no absolute First or 
Fourteenth Amendment right to a prior adversary hearing in all cases where allegedly obscene 
material is seized).  
 28.  Ric Simmons, Not “Voluntary” but Still Reasonable: A New Paradigm for 
Understanding the Consent Searches Doctrine, 80 IND. L.J. 773, 773 (2005) (“Over 90% of 
warrantless police searches are accomplished through the use of the consent exception to the 
Fourth Amendment.”); Marcy Strauss, Reconstructing Consent, 92 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 
211 (2001) (“Although precise figures detailing the number of searches conducted pursuant to 
consent are not—and probably can never be—available, there is no dispute that these type [sic] 
of searches affect tens of thousands, if not hundreds of thousands, of people every year.”). 
 29.  See Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 227–28 (1973) (discussing the value of 
searches based on consent); Georgia v. Randolph, 547 U.S. 103, 120–21 (2006) (discussing the 
role of consent in a search of a house when one resident consents and the other objects). It is 
worth noting that the entire field of search and seizure law depends, in a sense, on choice. A 
search occurs only when an individual’s reasonable expectation of privacy has been violated. 
See, e.g., Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 33 (2001) (“[A] Fourth Amendment search occurs 
when the government violates a subjective expectation of privacy that society recognizes as 
reasonable.” (citing Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring))). In 
many cases, this inquiry turns on whether a person has chosen to subject herself to public view 
or to put herself in the position where she knows she has no expectation of privacy. The cases 
are abundant. See, e.g., Dow Chemical Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227, 237–39 (1986) 
(holding that photographing an industrial complex with a precision aerial-mapping camera is 
not a search); United States v. Taketa, 923 F.2d 665, 667 (9th Cir. 1991) (holding that 
“[v]ideotaping of suspects in public places, such as banks, does not violate the fourth 
amendment” because there is no expectation of privacy in these places); United States v. 
Gonzalez, 328 F.3d 543, 547 (9th Cir. 2003) (holding that there is no reasonable expectation of 
privacy in a mailroom of a public hospital); Thompson v. Johnson Cnty. Cmty. Coll., 930 F. 
Supp. 501, 507 (D. Kan. 1996) (security personnel locker area of a community college); United 
States v. Lopez, 585 F. Supp. 1400, 1401 (D. Conn. 1984) (public street); United States v. Bifield, 
498 F. Supp. 497, 508 (D. Conn. 1980) (gas station); State v. Augafa, 992 P.2d 723, 734–37 (Haw. 
Ct. App. 1999) (public street); State v. Henry, 783 N.E.2d 609, 618–19 (Ohio Ct. App. 2002) 
(public restroom). 
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Consider United States v. Drayton,30 in which police stopped a bus 
in the middle of the night, far from its destination.31 Police boarded it 
and stood at the rear and the front.32 Another armed officer walked 
up and down the aisle, approached two seated passengers and asked 
them to open their luggage.33 The officer stood over them, blocking 
their exit, and did not say they had a right to refuse.34 The passengers 
“agreed” to have the officer look in their bags and the police officer 
found cocaine in the ensuing search.35 
The defendants challenged the search as not truly consensual, and 
of course they had a point. If Fourth Amendment “consent” means 
anything close to what “consent” means in other contexts, then 
perhaps the mere fact that the passengers knew a search would reveal 
drugs and result in their arrest is strong evidence that the search was a 
result of intimidation and pressure rather than choice. As Justice 
Souter pointed out, “[t]he police not only carry legitimate authority 
but also exercise power free from immediate check, and when the 
attention of several officers is brought to bear on one civilian the 
balance of immediate power is unmistakable.”36 He went on to say 
that such a “display of power” might “overbear a normal person’s 
ability to act freely, even in the absence of explicit commands.”37 
These arguments from Justice Souter, however, were made in 
dissent. In an opinion by Justice Kennedy, the Court held that the 
search was consensual because the passengers had a choice—they 
could have gotten off the bus.38 Even though this choice was not made 
clear to the defendants—the police officers had not informed the 
passengers that they could refuse the search and leave the bus—the 
Court concluded that “there was nothing coercive or confrontational 
about the encounter.”39 The Court’s position was that the existence of 
the option to exit the bus vitiated any coercion present in the 
government activity.40 The fact that the choice of getting off the bus in 
 
 30.  536 U.S. 194 (2002). 
 31.  Id. at 197. 
 32.  Id. at 197–98. 
 33.  Id. at 198. 
 34.  Id. at 198–99. 
 35.  Id. 
 36.  Id. at 210. 
 37.  Id. 
 38.  Id. at 201–02. 
 39.  Id. at 207–08 (internal quotation marks and brackets omitted). 
 40.  Id. at 207 (holding that the officer “did request permission to search, and the totality of 
the circumstances indicates that [the petitioner’s] consent was voluntary, so the searches were 
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the middle of the night in the middle of nowhere was not particularly 
enticing was not significant in the Court’s analysis. Just as in Gobitis, 
in which it was immaterial that the choice of moving to a different 
school district was burdensome, the Court focused not on the 
costliness of the choice but on whether a choice existed at all.41 
The Court also adopts the ultra-dispositionalist paradigm in 
unconstitutional conditions cases in which the condition is upheld 
against a constitutional challenge.42 The case of Rust v. Sullivan43 is 
perhaps the best example. In that case, the Court upheld a restriction 
on doctors working for federally funded clinics or hospitals that 
prevented them from counseling patients about the need for or 
availability of abortions. In an opinion by Chief Justice Rehnquist, the 
Court held that this was not an infringement on the First Amendment 
rights of the clinics or the doctors, because the clinics could refuse 
federal money and the doctors could work elsewhere.44 The Court 
emphasized that the doctors were “voluntarily employed” and that 
they “remain[ed] free” to “pursue abortion-related activities” 
 
reasonable” and stating that the arresting officer “addressed [the petitioner] in a polite manner 
and provided him with no indication that he was required to answer [the officer’s] questions”). 
 41.  For a situationalist, the influence of peer pressure is real, and the presence of 
consistent behavior by everyone in a situation is evidence that the situation is influencing 
everyone. Justice Kennedy rejects both arguments. As to peer pressure: “Indeed, because many 
fellow passengers are present to witness officers’ conduct, a reasonable person may feel even 
more secure in his or her decision not to cooperate with police on a bus than in other 
circumstances.” Id. at 195. That is, in Justice Kennedy’s view, the fact that one is surrounded by 
other passengers consenting to a search will embolden one to refuse. As to whether the fact that 
everyone on the bus consented to searches was evidence of coercion: “Finally, the fact that . . . 
only a few passengers . . . refuse[] to cooperate does not suggest that a reasonable person would 
not feel free to terminate the bus encounter. [B]us passengers answer officers' questions and 
otherwise cooperate not because of coercion. While most citizens will respond to a police 
request, the fact that people do so, and do so without being told they are free not to respond, 
hardly eliminates the consensual nature of the response.” Id. at 205. 
 42.  The unconstitutional conditions doctrine is notoriously difficult to apply, and the Court 
has reached seemingly inconsistent holdings across doctrinal areas of constitutional law. For 
analysis of the doctrine, see Cass Sunstein, Why the Unconstitutional Conditions Doctrine Is an 
Anachronism (with Particular Reference to Religion, Speech, and Abortion), 70 B.U. L. REV. 
593, 620 (1990) (arguing that the doctrine “is too crude and too general to provide help in 
contested cases”); Kathleen Sullivan, Unconstitutional Conditions, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1415, 
1416 (1989) (stating that the doctrine is “riven with inconsistencies”); R.L. Hale, 
Unconstitutional Conditions and Constitutional Rights, 35 COLUM. L. REV. 321, 322 (1935) 
(“The Supreme Court has sustained many such exertions of power even after announcing the 
broad doctrine that would invalidate them.”); Richard Epstein, Unconstitutional Conditions, 
State Power, and the Limits of Consent, 102 HARV. L. REV. 4, 6 (1988) (stating that the problem 
is a “basic structural issue that for over a hundred years has bedeviled courts and commentators 
alike”).  
 43.  500 U.S. 173 (1991). 
 44.  Id. at 199. 
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elsewhere.45 The limitation of their speech activities came about as “a 
consequence of their decision to accept employment” in the restricted 
project.46  Justice Blackmun dissented, pointing out that “it has never 
been sufficient to justify an otherwise unconstitutional condition upon 
public employment that the employee may escape the condition by 
relinquishing his or her job.”47 
The disagreement between Justices Rehnquist and Blackmun in 
Rust can be described as a disagreement between the libertarian and 
ultra-dispositionalist paradigms. Justice Blackmun saw the 
government restriction on funding as a violation of the doctors’ (and 
clinics’) freedom of speech in part because he viewed it to be coercive 
to offer a choice between exercising one’s free speech rights on the 
one hand and accepting government-funded employment on the 
other. Justice Rehnquist, for his part, thought the doctors’ free will 
was not infringed by this choice—the decision to maintain 
employment in the federally funded clinic was “voluntary” even 
though it came with significant government-imposed costs.48 
It may be easy to dismiss the ultra-dispositionalist paradigm as too 
sanguine about the power of individuals’ free will and their ability to 
choose freely. But before dismissing it, it is important to note that it 
has a distinguished set of defenders. In a sense, the social contract 
theory of Jean-Jacques Rousseau, in which he asserts that “residence 
constitutes consent,”49 corresponds to the ultra-dispositionalist 
 
 45.  Id. at 198–99. 
 46.  Id. 
 47.  Id. at 212 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). 
 48.  Another related example is Rumsfeld v. Forum for Academic and Institutional Rights, 
Inc., 547 U.S. 47 (2006), in which the Court upheld the so-called Solomon Amendment, which 
conditioned federal funding to universities on the institutions allowing military recruiters 
complete access to campus, even though the military refused to sign non-discrimination pledges 
as were required of other recruiters. In the oral argument at the Supreme Court, the question of 
whether conditioning the funds amounted to compelled speech was front and center. The 
attorney for Forum for Academic and Institutional Rights, Inc., argued that cutting off millions 
of dollars to a university amounted to a punishment for exercising its speech rights. Chief Justice 
Roberts shot back, saying that the statute “doesn't insist that you do anything. It says that, ‘If 
you want our money, you have to let our recruiters on campus.’” Transcript of Oral Argument 
at 32, Rumsfeld v. Forum for Academic and Institutional Rights, Inc., 547 U.S. 47 (2006) (No. 
04-1152). The Supreme Court’s ultimate disposition, however, sidestepped the question of 
whether the threat of a cutoff of funding amounted to compulsion, saying that the statute 
governed behavior, not speech. Id. at 48. 
 49.  JEAN-JACQUES ROUSSEAU, THE SOCIAL CONTRACT, BOOK IV (“When the State is 
instituted, residence constitutes consent; to dwell within its territory is to submit to the 
Sovereign.”). For the opposite view, see RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE 192–93 (1986) 
(“Consent cannot be binding on people . . . unless it is given more freely, and with more genuine 
alternate choice, than just by declining to build a life from nothing under a foreign flag.”). 
GREENFIELD 11.16.11 V.1 (DO NOT DELETE) 11/16/2011  10:53 AM 
14 DUKE JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW & PUBLIC POLICY SPECIAL ISSUE [VOL. 7 
paradigm. According to Rousseau, anyone who chooses to live within 
a jurisdiction can be considered to have agreed to whatever laws that 
jurisdiction puts forth. That sounds quite a bit like Justice Frankfurter 
in Barnette. Another example of a defense (albeit an implicit one) of 
the ultra-dispositionalist paradigm is that of Professor Steven 
Calabresi, one of the nation’s leading constitutional law scholars. He 
has written that various disagreements over gay rights should be 
handled by having LGBT people move to “secular” cities, while 
“Americans of faith” should “form and live in communities” where 
they can discriminate openly.50 Following Rousseau, he suggests that 
“those who choose to live in a part of the country where their views 
on homosexuality are in the minority should learn to gracefully put 
up with a prevalence of opposing views.”51 This, too, takes residence as 
consent, which tracks Justice Frankfurter’s view in Barnette 
(attendance at a school constitutes consent to recite the Pledge), the 
Court’s views in Drayton (presence in a bus constitutes consent to 
search), and the Court’s decision in Rust (employment in certain 
workplaces constitutes consent to fewer speech rights). 
IV. THE LIBERTARIAN PARADIGM 
Implicit in hundreds of Supreme Court decisions is an assumption 
that absent government involvement in individuals’ choices, the 
individuals are acting freely and willfully. This is the libertarian 
paradigm. Government mandates are seen as coercion; government 
bans are infringements on liberty. Government inactivity is the default 
position, and government activity must be justified as a moral matter 
because it elbows aside volition. 
Other than Barnette, perhaps the most famous use of the 
libertarian paradigm in constitutional law occurred during the 
Supreme Court’s so-called Lochner era, which lasted for 
approximately fifty years from the latter part of the nineteenth 
century until the mid-1930s. During that time, the Supreme Court 
routinely struck down economic regulations as violations of freedom 
of contract. The freedom of contract—really a principle of freedom of 
economic choice—was seen as a value to be protected from 
governmental attack. Any regulation of economic life that 
 
 50.  Steven G. Calabresi, Lawrence, the Fourteenth Amendment, and the Supreme Court’s 
Reliance on Foreign Constitutional Law: An Originalist Reappraisal, 65 OHIO ST. L. J. 1097, 1123 
(2004). 
 51.  Id. 
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constrained choice was constitutionally suspect. In Lochner v. New 
York52 itself, the Court juxtaposed the right of the state to regulate 
with the right of the workers to choose the conditions of their job: 
[W]hen the state . . . has passed an act which seriously limits the 
right to labor or the right of contract in regard to their means of 
livelihood . . . it becomes of great importance to determine which 
shall prevail—the right of the individual to labor for such time as 
he may choose, or the right of the state to prevent the individual 
from laboring . . . .53 
Consistent with the libertarian paradigm, this notion of choice was 
not very robust because it ignored the constraints faced by the 
workers in the contracting process. Few would seriously contend that 
a robust choice is available when the two alternatives are to work in 
unsafe conditions for sixty hours per week or to go hungry because of 
lack of money. But the absence of real alternatives did not much 
bother the Court. As long as the government was not skewing the 
choices of the parties to a contract, the differences in bargaining 
power or the dearth of alternatives for either party did not vitiate the 
sanctity of the choices made. 
A central assumption at this time was that the market was natural 
and given, so that anything occurring within it bore the imprimatur of 
consent. The market was free—whatever happened in it was chosen, 
and choice was a liberty to be protected by the Constitution. Free 
choice thus was defined as what happens in the absence of 
government intervention. As such, though the Lochner decision was 
about a government ban (of work weeks lasting longer than sixty 
hours), the Lochner-era Court also was worried about government 
mandates. Minimum-wage laws—a mandate—were just as suspect as 
maximum-hour laws—a ban.54 
The libertarian paradigm later weakened in the area of economic 
freedoms (more on this later), but remained robust in substantive due 
process generally and indeed in many other areas of constitutional 
law. One revealing analysis concerns the abortion cases Roe v. Wade55 
and Harris v. McRae.56 In Roe, of course, the Court struck down 
 
 52.  198 U.S. 45 (1905). 
 53.  Id. at 54. 
 54.  See, e.g., Adkins v. Children’s Hospital, 261 U.S. 525 (1923) (invalidating a minimum-
wage law for women). 
 55.  410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
 56.  448 U.S. 297 (1980). 
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government bans on abortion services, stating that the Fourteenth 
Amendment’s “concept of personal liberty and restrictions upon state 
action . . . is broad enough to encompass a woman’s decision whether 
or not to terminate her pregnancy.”57 The Court explicitly recognized 
state action as a limit on free choice: “The detriment that the State 
would impose upon the pregnant woman by denying this choice 
altogether is apparent.”58 Justice Stewart, concurring, also explicitly 
relied on assumptions about choice and will: “[F]reedom of personal 
choice in matters of marriage and family life is one of the liberties 
protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.”59 In Roe, then, a state ban on abortions was seen as 
coercing a choice to remain pregnant. The Court assumed that once 
the government stepped out of the decision-making process, what was 
left was choice. 
It is worth noticing, however, that the women who wanted to 
terminate their pregnancies in fact had options other than to get an 
abortion and risk prosecution. Like the students in Barnette, they 
could have traveled to a jurisdiction where their preferred choice was 
not illegal. Indeed, in the Roe oral argument, the assistant attorney 
general who argued in support of Texas’s abortion prohibition 
suggested that the real choice was made at the time Roe became 
pregnant: “Now I think she makes her choice prior to the time she 
becomes pregnant. That is the time of the choice. . . . Once a child is 
born, a woman has no choice, and I think pregnancy then terminates 
that choice.”60 In direct response, Justice White added another take on 
choice, saying, “Maybe she makes her choice when she decides to live 
in Texas.”61 It is unclear whether Justice White’s comment was 
intended to be sarcastic. It was greeted with laughter by the audience 
in the courtroom, but he ultimately dissented from the Court’s 
opinion, suggesting that he could have believed that Roe should have 
been held accountable for her earlier choice to move to Texas, a 
jurisdiction that banned abortions. In any event, it is notable that 
Justice White’s question is analogous to the argument used by Justice 
Frankfurter in Barnette. 
 
 57.  Roe, 410 U.S. at 153. 
 58.  Id. 
 59.  Id. at 169 (Stewart, J., concurring) (quoting Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 
U.S. 632, 639–40 (1974)). 
 60.  Roe v. Wade Oral Arguments, 8 SETON HALL CONST. L.J. 315, 331 (1998). 
 61.  Id. 
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This implicit use of the libertarian paradigm was made more 
apparent in Harris v. McRae, in which the Court upheld a restriction 
against using Medicaid and other federal monies for abortions.62 The 
Court saw the use of Medicaid for the termination of pregnancies as 
coercive to those who did not want their tax money spent on 
abortions, so a ban on such use was seen as liberating to those 
taxpayers.63 But the libertarian paradigm is even more obvious in light 
of the Court’s rejection of Justice Brennan’s argument in dissent that 
federal abortion funding was necessary to make freedom of choice 
genuine by relieving pregnant women from the coercive effects of 
financial need.64 
Justice Brennan used the situationalist paradigm and criticized the 
Court for failing to recognize that the government’s “denial of public 
funds for medically necessary abortions . . . serves to coerce indigent 
pregnant women to bear children that they would otherwise elect not 
to have.”65 Justice Brennan’s point was that the economic situation of 
many women was such that they had no genuine ability to exercise 
free choice. Their ability to exercise choice was limited by their 
situation. Government-provided financial assistance would have 
liberated those women from economic coercion to bring their 
pregnancies to full term. 
But the Court saw limits on choice as springing only from 
government action and not from situation. Because the economic 
situations of those poor women were not of the government’s making, 
the limitations on their freedom of choice were beyond the concern of 
the Court. 
Scores of additional cases reveal the Court’s use of the libertarian 
paradigm. Cases striking down unconstitutional conditions often draw 
on libertarian assumptions about free will. For example, in Speiser v. 
Randall,66 the Court held that the state of California could not 
condition a property-tax exemption for veterans on their willingness 
to swear a loyalty oath.67 The condition would result in “a deterrence 
of speech which the Constitution makes free.”68 Implicit in this 
holding is the notion that it was impermissible for the government to 
 
 62.  Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 297 (1980). 
 63.  Id. at 315–16. 
 64.  Id. at 335–36 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
 65.  Id. at 330. 
 66.  357 U.S. 513 (1958). 
 67.  Id. 
 68.  Id. at 526. 
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impose costs on certain choices, and that those costs would indeed 
affect people’s behavior. Similarly, in Abood v. Detroit Board of 
Education,69 the Court struck down a requirement that, as a condition 
of employment in Detroit public schools, teachers must pay dues to 
the teachers’ union for purposes of political speech.70 The Court was 
explicit that it believed such a condition amounted to coercion: “[A]t 
the heart of the First Amendment is the notion that an individual 
should be free to believe as he will . . . rather than [be] coerced by the 
state.”71 
These holdings correlate nicely with Barnette. To discover 
coercion, the Court need not decide that no other options exist. If that 
were the test, then the outcome would be different in cases like 
Speiser and Abood. The veteran could decline to take the tax 
exemption and the teacher could teach in a private school. They could 
both move to another jurisdiction, as the Court suggested in Gobitis, 
or they could work democratically to change the laws that burdened 
them, as Justice Frankfurter suggested in Barnette. But under the 
libertarian paradigm, the existence of these choices does not mean 
that the government restriction was not coercive. Instead, coercion 
can be found when the state makes a certain choice (or set of choices) 
significantly more costly than it would be without government 
intervention. The Court’s focus is on the government activity. 
V.  THE SITUATIONALIST PARADIGM 
In some cases, the Court implicitly uses a model of human agency 
that considers the situation relevant, even parts of the situation not 
directly created or influenced by government. In contrast to the ultra-
dispositionalist paradigm, this model does not take the strength of 
human will as a given. In contrast to the libertarian paradigm, this 
model still considers government activity relevant but also considers 
other possible influences and constraints on choice. 
A shift in the Court’s economic substantive due process cases 
from the libertarian to the situationalist paradigm significantly 
contributed to the end of the Lochner era. The Lochner-era Courts’ 
 
 69.  431 U.S. 209 (1977). 
 70.  Id. 
 71.  Id. at 234–35; see also Gardner v. Broderick, 392 U.S. 273, 279 (1968) (reversing the 
dismissal of a police officer who had not waived Fifth Amendment privilege while testifying 
before a grand jury investigating official corruption, stating that loss of employment was an 
“attempt, regardless of its ultimate effectiveness, to coerce a waiver of immunity”). 
GREENFIELD 11.16.11 V.1 (DO NOT DELETE) 11/16/2011  10:53 AM 
2011] FREE WILL PARADIGMS 19 
laissez-faire assumption about human decision-making was that 
government regulation was the source of coercion. When the nation 
fell into the depths of the Great Depression, however, the principles 
of laissez-faire economics came under attack and the Court began to 
question its understanding of choice and coercion. Eventually, the 
Court recognized that the so-called free market could be a source of 
coercion that government regulation might be necessary to 
counteract. 
This insight helped bring about a sea of change in economics, law, 
and politics.72 The intellectual giants of the era saw that the “free 
market” was a creature of politics and law, and a creature to be tamed 
by the same forces.73 The market was not an area ruled by choice, but 
dominated by coercion, forcing people to sell their labor in horrid 
conditions in order to house, feed, and clothe themselves and their 
families. New Deal theorists recognized that choice in the narrow, 
limited sense, which had been protected by the Lochner-era Court, 
was not only inconsistent with economic well-being but also 
inconsistent with a robust understanding of consent and coercion. 
Government assistance was necessary to make real choices available. 
In West Coast Hotel v. Parrish,74 the case marking the end of the 
Lochner era, the Court recognized the coercion of the marketplace: 
 
 
 72.  See generally CASS R. SUNSTEIN, THE PARTIAL CONSTITUTION 45–62 (1993); see also 
HOWARD GILLMAN, THE CONSTITUTION BESIEGED: THE RISE AND DEMISE OF LOCHNER 
ERA POLICE POWERS JURISPRUDENCE 201–02 (1993) (writing that “‘[t]he constitutional 
revolution of 1937’ marked the moment when the founders’ conception of faction-free 
American Republic collapsed under the onslaught of corporate capitalism . . . . The presidency 
was fundamentally transformed into a ‘popular’ branch that was expected to be a programmatic 
leader of an increasingly fragmented political system; the Senate was formally democratized; the 
line separating the domains of national and state control over commerce, so carefully drawn by 
the founders and protected by the Court, was erased with the New Deal’s extension of federal 
authority to include control over local manufacturing and production; and long-standing 
standards regulating Congress’s ability to delegate rule-making authority to executive agencies 
were set aside”); STEPHEN M. GRIFFIN, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONALISM: FROM THEORY TO 
POLITICS 100–03 (1996); MORTON HOROWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 
1870–1960, at 33 (1992); Stephen A. Siegel, Lochner Era Jurisprudence and the American 
Constitutional Tradition, 70 N.C. L. REV. 1 (1991). 
 73.  The most influential piece from the time likely is Robert L. Hale, Coercion and 
Distribution in a Supposedly Non-Coercive State, 38 POLI. SCI. Q. 470 (1923). See also SUNSTEIN, 
supra note 72, at 48–49 (“If coercion and law were seen there [in the market], regulation would 
be a justified corrective. The same principle that doomed slavery could also call for government 
assistance against the forms of coercion that drive people to take menial jobs at trivial pay, or 
that force people to work sixty hours per week if they are to work at all.”). For more on the 
coercion of the market, see GREENFIELD, supra note 1, at 119. 
 74.  300 U.S. 379 (1937) (upholding a minimum-wage law). 
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In other words, the proprietors lay down the rules, and the laborers 
are practically constrained to obey them. . . . [T]he fact that “both 
parties are of full age, and competent to contract, does not 
necessarily deprive the state of the power to interfere, where the 
parties do not stand upon an equality, or where the public health 
demands that one party to the contract shall be protected against 
himself.”75 
Thus, in the eyes of the Court, the “freedom” of the parties 
involved was not simply a function of government regulation (as it 
would be in the libertarian paradigm) but of their economic situation 
and market power. Moreover, the existence of other choices—a 
different job, a different location—was immaterial (though they 
would be dispositive in the ultra-dispositionalist view). What mattered 
was whether, given the reality of the situation, people were truly free 
or “practically constrained.” This is the embodiment of situationalism. 
Another example of the use of the situationalist paradigm by the 
Court is the case of Lee v. Weisman,76 where the Court prohibited 
prayers from being a part of public school graduation ceremonies. 
Parents of a graduating senior brought suit against their public school 
to enjoin it from including a prayer in its graduation ceremony, saying 
the prayer was a violation of the First Amendment’s Establishment 
Clause.77 The school defended the prayer by saying the student’s 
attendance at the ceremony was voluntary and that she could refuse 
to participate in the prayer or the ceremony itself.78 
In the eyes of the Court, however, it was not dispositive that the 
student could choose not to participate.79 The Court recognized the 
reality of the situation of high school students put in such a position. 
Writing for the Court, Justice Kennedy recognized the importance of 
“protecting freedom of conscience from subtle coercive pressure” that 
arises from “public pressure, as well as peer pressure.”80 Justice 
Kennedy recognized that “[t]his pressure, though subtle and indirect, 
can be as real as any overt compulsion.”81 He set aside the question of 
whether “mature adults” are subject to such pressure, but asserted 
that “[r]esearch in psychology supports the common assumption that 
 
 75.  Id. at 394 (quoting Holden v. Hardy, 169 U.S. 366, 397 (1898)). 
 76.  505 U.S. 577 (1992). 
 77.  Id. at 584. 
 78.  Id. at 586. 
 79.  Id. at 593. 
 80.  Id. at 592.  
 81.  Id. at 593.  
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adolescents are often susceptible to pressure from their peers towards 
conformity, and that the influence is strongest in matters of social 
convention.”82 
Justice Kennedy’s opinion is a remarkable recognition of the 
power of situation in individual decision-making, at least with regard 
to minors. Justice Kennedy does, to be sure, sound the notes of the 
libertarian paradigm by recognizing that it is the state that is 
“plac[ing] objectors in the dilemma of participating, with all that 
implies, or protesting.”83 Still, Weisman is a more situationalist than 
libertarian opinion because Justice Kennedy sees the costs of the state 
action only by recognizing the pressures brought to bear by the 
situation. To illustrate, compare Weisman with the law surrounding 
the Pledge of Allegiance after Barnette. Under current law, the state 
can compel public schools to start their day with a school-wide 
recitation of the Pledge.84 As long as students may opt out, it is not 
seen as coercing students to speak in violation of the First 
Amendment. In Weisman, however, Justice Kennedy is attuned to the 
coercive effects of situation. He says the school’s argument that there 
is no coercion inherent in the ceremony “lacks all persuasion. . . . [T]o 
say a teenage student has a real choice not to attend her high school 
graduation is formalistic in the extreme.”85 He draws on conventional 
wisdom—“everyone knows that in our society and in our culture high 
school graduation is one of life’s most significant occasions”—and 
uses a nuanced understanding of coercion—“a student is not free to 
absent herself from the graduation exercise in any real sense of the 
term ‘voluntary,’ for absence would require forfeiture of those 
intangible benefits which have motivated the student through youth 
and all her high school years.”86 The government rule is influential 
only because of social pressures, and “the government may no more 
use social pressure to enforce orthodoxy than it may use more direct 
means.”87 
 
 
 82.  Id. 
 83.  Id.; see also id. at 587 (“A school official, the principal, decided that an invocation and 
a benediction should be given; this is a choice attributable to the State, and from a constitutional 
perspective it is as if a state statute decreed that the prayers must occur.”). 
 84.  Cf. Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 5 (2004) (rejecting a First 
Amendment-based challenge to the Pledge on standing grounds). See supra note 16. 
 85.  Weisman, 505 U.S. at 595.  
 86.  Id. 
 87.  Id. at 594. 
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One could compare Justice Kennedy’s ultra-dispositionalist 
opinion in Drayton (the bus search case) with his situationalist 
opinion in Weisman. Perhaps the difference is based on the minor 
status of the plaintiff in Weisman, or perhaps on the difference 
between the nature of voluntariness in the Fourth Amendment 
context as opposed to the Establishment Clause context. One might 
also think that Justice Kennedy simply is more attuned to the 
situation of religious minorities than to the situation of those targeted 
by law enforcement officers.88 
Like the other paradigms, the situationalist paradigm claims a 
number of distinguished adherents. As mentioned at the beginning of 
this article, many legal scholars have begun to use insights from 
cognitive and behavioral science and economics to question the 
mainstream libertarian view of human decision-making. Scholars such 
as Cass Sunstein, Christine Jolls, Jon Hanson, Owen Jones, John 
Humbach, David Yosifon, Adam Benforado, and Dan Kahan, to name 
several, are contributing important arguments about the legal 
significance of situation in human decision-making.89 
Perhaps the most provocative example of situationalist reasoning 
in constitutional law is in the work of some feminist theorists, most 
notably Professor Catharine MacKinnon. In her book Only Words, 
 
 88.  Another revealing example of Justice Kennedy’s use of the situationalist paradigm 
came in his opinion for the Court in Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124 (2007). In this case, the 
Court upheld the “Partial Birth Abortion Act” of 2003. In his opinion, Justice Kennedy 
suggested that late-term abortions could be banned because many women made that choice 
because of the constraints of their situation and that they would later regret that choice. 
“Whether to have an abortion requires a difficult and painful moral decision . . . . While we find 
no reliable data to measure the phenomenon, it seems unexceptionable to conclude some 
women come to regret their choice to abort the infant life they once created and sustained. . . . 
The State has an interest in ensuring so grave a choice is well informed.” Id. at 128, 159. Justice 
Ginsberg dissented, saying: “[T]he Court invokes an antiabortion shibboleth for which it 
concededly has no reliable evidence: Women who have abortions come to regret their choices, 
and consequently suffer from ‘[s]evere depression and loss of esteem.’ Because of women’s 
fragile emotional state and because of the ‘bond of love the mother has for her child,’ the Court 
worries, doctors may withhold information about the nature of the intact D & E procedure. The 
solution the Court approves, then, is not to require doctors to inform women, accurately and 
adequately, of the different procedures and their attendant risks. Instead, the Court deprives 
women of the right to make an autonomous choice, even at the expense of their safety.” Id. at 
183–84 (alteration in original) (citations omitted). 
 89.  See supra note 24. See also RICHARD H. THALER & CASS R. SUNSTEIN, NUDGE 
(2008); Christine Jolls, Cass R. Sunstein & Richard Thaler, A Behavioral Approach to Law and 
Economics, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1471 (1998); Dan M. Kahan & Donald Braman, Cultural 
Cognition and Public Policy, 24 YALE L. & POL’Y REV., 149 (2006); Dan M. Kahan, Culture, 
Cognition, and Consent: Who Perceives What, and Why, in Acquaintance Rape Cases, 158 U. PA. 
L. REV. 729 (2010). 
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MacKinnon argues that women are often coerced by situation: 
Empirically, all pornography is made under conditions of 
inequality based on sex, overwhelmingly by poor, desperate, 
homeless, pimped women who were sexually abused as children. 
The industry’s profits exploit, and are an incentive to maintain 
these conditions. These conditions constrain choice rather than 
offering freedom.90 
In other words, because the situations in which some women find 
themselves are so limiting, the choices of those women are best 
understood as products of coercion rather than choice. When that is 
true, one could reasonably believe that a restriction on the production 
of pornography would be choice-enhancing (at least for women) 
rather than choice-reducing. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The notion of free will has long been a pivotal question in law, 
both implicitly and explicitly. While philosophers have largely fallen 
into camps that divide between those who believe free will exists and 
those who do not, legal thinking on the question can be placed in 
three general categories. The purpose of this article was to sketch out 
these three paradigms using constitutional cases decided by the 
Supreme Court. While legal thought traditionally has been 
characterized by an assumption of robust free will—and that 
assumption continues to have significant influence—constitutional 
analysis in fact is more nuanced and occasionally takes into account 
governmental and situational limits on choice and free will.91 The 
Court sometimes sees human will as influenced by, or even a product 
of, situation or governmental pressure. That is, there are cases that 
map better to the philosophical determinists (who see will as an 
endogenous variable) than the metaphysical libertarians (who see will 
as an exogenous variable). 
 
 90.  CATHARINE MACKINNON, ONLY WORDS 20 (1993). Obviously, her view is not 
universal. See, e.g., ALAN WERTHEIMER, CONSENT TO SEXUAL RELATIONS 191 (2003) (“I do 
not doubt that women sometimes agree to sexual relations that they would reject under 
different or more just or equal background conditions. But we do not enhance their welfare or 
their autonomy by denying the transformative power of their consent.”). 
 91.  It is worth noting that there are other examples of areas of law, outside of 
constitutional law, where courts are attuned to the power of situation. One example is contract 
law. See Kent Greenfield, Unconscionability and Consent in Corporate Law, 96 IOWA L. REV. 
BULL. 92 (2011) (discussing contract law’s ability to take account of situational particularities in 
reaching just outcomes). 
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The Court’s three paradigms essentially turn on how robust it 
believes human will to be. In the ultra-dispositionalist paradigm, the 
individual’s will stands inviolate even in the face of firm government 
pressure. If options exist other than succumbing to that pressure, then 
the Court assumes free will exists. In the libertarian paradigm, the 
Court recognizes that government pressure can affect choices and 
vitiate consent. The presence of other options does not protect the 
government’s action from constitutional challenge. The focus in the 
libertarian paradigm, however, is only on government influence; the 
coercive effects of a given situation are immaterial if they do not flow 
directly from the government. In the situationalist paradigm, the 
coercive influence of non-governmental actors is relevant in the 
constitutional analysis of freedom and consent. Future study could 
help discern if there is a pattern in the Court’s use of one paradigm or 
another in various cases.92 
 
 
 92.  It would be particularly intriguing to track Justice Kennedy’s reasoning across cases, 
and not just because he is the most powerful jurist in the country. He has written opinions that 
fit on both ends of the spectrum in terms of a belief in the robustness of free will: bus passengers 
surrounded by police officers consented to having their bags searched even when they did not 
know refusal was a possibility, but high school students were coerced by social pressure to pray 
during a graduation ceremony. Is the only difference age? Are there other differences? And if 
age is the key difference, would Justice Kennedy believe that a student is free to refuse to recite 
the Pledge at the beginning of her school day? 
